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Preface
In this issue of the Gáldu čála journal on the rights of indigenous peoples, we 
have invited Ulf Mörkenstam, Eva Josefsen and Ragnhild Nilsson to write an 
article on the Sami Parliaments as bodies for exercising the right of indige-
nous peoples to self-determination. The article is based on research projects 
that the authors have participated in or continue to take part in, including the 
findings from the Formas-funded election study project: “The Sámi Parliaments 
as Representative Bodies: A Comparative Study of the Elections in Sweden and 
Norway 2013”. The Sami Parliaments of Finland, Norway and Sweden are 
often highlighted as good examples internationally of how indigenous peoples’ 
right of self-determination can be achieved within democratic states. The 
authors undertake a comparison of the Sami Parliaments, and cast a critical 
glance on how these popularly elected bodies function and in particular which 
limitations these bodies have in the exercise of Sami self-determination and 
self-government.
 
Gáldu has chosen to launch this journal during the 15th session of the UN 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Peoples Issues, as one of the main topics 
of this meeting is precisely how to strengthen the participation of indigenous 
peoples in the UN system. The Sami Parliaments are key players in the global 
cooperation between indigenous peoples, but there continue to be restrictions 
in the UN system that complicate the efforts of indigenous peoples to be heard 
in processes that are of great importance to them and their communities. In line 
with the recommendations of the final document from the World Conference 
on Indigenous Peoples - 2014, the UN Secretary General has initiated consul-
tations with UN member states and the indigenous peoples of the world on 
how to strengthen the representation of indigenous peoples in the UN system. 
An Inter-Agency Support Group (IASG) has been established to assist the UN 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues in their endeavour to ensure implemen-
tation of international standards with respect to the rights of indigenous peoples, 
in particular the standards and targets of the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples. In 2015 the IASG completed an overarching action plan 
where Point 6 states the following concerning the participation of representa-
tives and institutions of indigenous peoples’ in the US system:
“Although the participation of indigenous peoples’ representatives and institu-
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tions in meetings of relevant UN bodies is a matter that the General Assembly 
will continue to consider, the UN system can take concrete and practical steps 
towards increased full and effective participation in processes that affect them. 
This can include consultative mechanisms, funds, and tools for seeking free, 
prior and informed consent and other means for facilitating full and effective 
participation of indigenous peoples including indigenous women, Elders, 
persons with disabilities as well as indigenous children and youth.”
http://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/wp-content/uploads/
sites/19/2015/11/System-wide-action-plan.pdf 
The final document of the World Conference on Indigenous Peoples also ac-
knowledges that a considerable amount of work remains in the effort to ensure 
the implementation of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
at national and local levels. Among other things it assumes that indigenous 
peoples are included in the work to implement the objectives of the declaration. 
This article takes a critical look at the Sami elected bodies, the Sami Parliaments, 
and points to the significant differences between the Sami Parliaments both 
organizationally and politically. Not least, the article offers an insight into 
something that could constitute a challenge when working to arrange a joint 
Nordic Saami Convention, particularly given the different organisation of the 
Sami Parliaments. It is to be hoped that the article will be of use to other indig-
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Abstract
From an international perspective, the popularly elected Sámediggis (Sámi 
Parliaments), established more than two decades ago in the Nordic countries 
of Finland, Norway and Sweden, represent unique institutional arrangements to 
enhance and safeguard indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination. In this 
article the authors compare the legal basis, status, authority and mandate of the 
Sámi people’s representative institutions, as well as the actual influence and 
autonomy of the Sámediggis in relation to the national political institutions in 
the respective country. 
The comparison reveals several differences between the institutions and brings 
to the fore three problems manifesting different ways in which nation-states 
may delimit indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination: 1) how a popularly 
elected indigenous parliament that successfully gains political autonomy and 
influence through participation in national politics and institutions always 
run the risk of being set aside by the State on matters of conflict (Norway); 2) 
how the historical legacy of a divide and rule government policy may justify a 
continued paternalistic state politics by perpetuating power relations within the 
indigenous community (Sweden); and 3) how conflicts between an indigenous 
people and the State in which they live concerning the right to define the people 
may delimit the right to self-determination and further conflicts between groups 
claiming indigenous status (Finland). 
The authors argue in their concluding remarks that these kinds of indigenous 
institutions may be a way to increase political autonomy and influence, and 
ultimately a relational form of self-determination within already existing state 
boundaries. There are, however, several obstacles for the Sámediggis of today 
to safeguarding Sámi self-determination, including the colonial past, the formal 
status granted the parliament, and the national policy and implementation of 
international law. Moreover, the different ways in which the states have handled 
these obstacles lead the authors to ask if the Sámediggis might best be un-
derstood as three distinct ways of institutionalising non-territorial indigenous 
self-determination; rather than as a unified Nordic model.
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Introduction
When the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) was 
adopted in 2007 it was mainly the result of indigenous peoples’ political struggle 
and mobilisation stretching over decades on a local, national and internation-
al level (see e.g., Anaya 2009; Brysk 2000; Minde 2003). No doubt the third 
article of the UNDRIP—a replication of the first paragraph of the two principal 
human rights covenants from 1966, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESC)—is paramount in this context, since it states that 
“[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right 
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development” (Art. 3). It is the will of the indigenous peoples 
that ought to determine their political status and their economic, cultural and 
social development. The right to self-determination has, however, commonly 
been interpreted in terms of a right to internal autonomy, something made 
explicit in the subsequent fourth article of the UNDRIP: “Indigenous peoples, 
in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or 
self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs […]”. 
Indigenous peoples have a right to self-determination like all other peoples, 
but their right is limited to that of internal self-governance. The UNDRIP thus 
explicitly holds within it two positions: firstly that indigenous peoples have a 
right to self-determination equal to any other people, and secondly that this 
right is limited to self-determination within an already existing state. These two 
positions are also found in the debate on indigenous self-determination. 
The main argument in support of a delimited right to self-determination 
has been by reference to the actual will of indigenous peoples, i.e. indigenous 
peoples do not strive for independence or secession and they don’t seek self-de-
termination or sovereignty for themselves in a classical way. Rather, “indigenous 
peoples themselves have overwhelmingly expressed their preference for consti-
tutional reform within existing States”, as Erica-Irene Daes (1993, 9-10) argues, 
due to their “small size, limited resources, and vulnerability” (see also, e.g., 
Quane 2011; Stavenhagen 2011; Young 2005). Independence is thus not seen as 
a viable option for indigenous peoples in political practice, since “the situation 
1  The article is written under the auspices of three projects: “The Sámi Parliaments as representative bodies: 
A Comparative Study of the Elections in Sweden and Norway 2013” (funded by the Swedish Research Council 
FORMAS), “The 2013 Norwegian Sámi Parliament Election Study” (funded by the Norwegian Sámediggi) and 
“Globalisation and New Political Rights. The Challenges of the Rights to Inclusion, Self-Determination and 
Secession” (financed by the Swedish Research Council, Vetenskapsrådet)
1
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or context in which indigenous peoples find themselves means that exercise of 
self-government for indigenous peoples will have to be within existing states” 
(Moore 2003, 104). 
This is, however, a contested claim, since indigenous representatives have 
repeatedly stated that there could not be “any distinction between ‘indigenous’ 
peoples and ‘peoples’ generally […]. Some governments have even suggested 
formulating ‘a special indigenous version of the right to self-determination’. 
We cannot accept such an approach because it would be a discriminatory appli-
cation of international law”, as argued by the former President of the Swedish 
Sámi Parliament (Sámediggi in Northern Sámi), Lars-Anders Baer (2005, 
229-230). To condition indigenous self-determination would be to deny indig-
enous peoples a right already accorded to other peoples, and thus to perpetuate 
a hierarchical societal order in which one people may continue to dominate the 
other(s) (see e.g., Buchanan 2004; Xanthaki 2007). Moreover, this delimited 
understanding seems to be in conflict with the fact that indigenous peoples in 
many parts of the world at no time ceded their sovereignty (Alfred 1999). 
A delimited right to self-determination is also justified from a more statist or 
“realist” perspective, which could be summarised by using the words of Hurst 
Hannum (2006, 75) a year before the UNDRIP was adopted: “there is no hope 
that an international body such as the UN […] would adopt an instrument that 
would legitimize secession”. That “is a brute political fact” (Levy 2008, 69). 
The statements made by indigenous representatives “that the right to self-deter-
mination does not necessarily imply a right of a separate sovereign existence” 
(Anaya 2009, 60) was also crucial in the preparatory work of the UNDRIP, and 
this limited understanding of indigenous self-determination was decisive in the 
process leading to its adoption (Henriksen 2008; Wiessner 2008).2
This understanding of indigenous self-determination is also well in accordance 
with the development of state practices to meet the right claims of indigenous 
peoples (although most states have not developed any practice at all, or even 
recognised the rights of the indigenous peoples living within their territories). 
Several different forms of institutional arrangements for internal autonomy can 
be discerned. Regional or local self-governance within a well-defined territory 
of an already existing nation-state, i.e. intra-state autonomy, may be an option 
where an indigenous people constitutes a majority within a geographically 
2   The exclusion of a right to secession is also made explicit in the closing article of the UNDRIP, which states that 
“[n]othing in this Declaration may be interpreted as […] authorizing or encouraging any action which would dis-
member or impair, totally, or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States” 
(Art. 46).
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concentrated area. Such a development is, for instance, discernible in Canada 
when the federal government created a third territory, Nunavut in 1999, to grant 
Inuit control over health and social services, education, economic development, 
tourism and resource exploitation (Penikett and Goldenberg 2013). 
Most often, however, indigenous peoples constitute a minority on their tra-
ditional land, living interspersed among other people. In these cases, systems 
for non-territorial autonomy to ensure political representation of indigenous 
peoples will be more attractive solutions, such as reserved seats in the national 
parliament or the establishment of separate institutions (see e.g., Robbins 2015). 
The solution in Aotearoa/New Zealand is an example of the former, where 
Maori have had dedicated seats in the House of Representatives since 1876 
(Xanthaki and O’Sullivan 2009). Greenland, with a majority Inuit population, 
are a territorially self-governing entity within the Danish State, and in addition 
Greenland have dedicated seats in the Danish Parliament (see e.g., Alfredsson 
2004). The development in Greenland in the last decade is of specific interest 
in this context, since Denmark through the Greenland Self-Government Act 
from 2009 recognises the people of Greenland as having the right to self-de-
termination in accordance with international law, and the Act contains explicit 
provisions for a right to independence. If supported by the people of Greenland 
in a referendum, negotiations with the Danish State on the establishment of a 
sovereign state ought to commence (see e.g., Hartig Danielsen 2013). 
Another way to ensure political representation of indigenous peoples has been 
to create separate institutions to ensure non-territorial autonomy. This was the 
common response from the Nordic states in their establishments of Sámediggis 
in 1989 (Norway), 1993 (Sweden) and 1995 (Finland) (see e.g., Josefsen, 
Mörkenstam and Saglie 2015).3 The non-territorial approach is strongly linked 
to the fact that the Sámi are in a minority within the traditional settlement area of 
the Sámi, Sápmi, covering the northern parts of Norway, Sweden, Finland and 
the Kola Peninsula of Russia, and they constitute a majority only in specific parts 
of this area. Through the course of history, the Sámi have been divided between 
these four nation-states, and ever since the nineteenth century, the Sámi have 
become increasingly enclosed into separate national arenas. The Sámediggis 
are intended to represent the Sámi people in each of the Nordic countries—
the idea of establishing a parliament is still a point of contention among the 
3 The first popularly elected Sámi Parliament in the Nordic countries was established in Finland as early as 1973 
(called the Sámi Delegation) but with a different mandate and legal status than the parliament of today (see e.g., 
Müller-Wille 1979).
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Sámi in Russia (Berg-Nordlie 2015)—and not the Sámi people living in all 
four countries, or within the whole of Sápmi. From an international perspective, 
the Sámediggis are of interest as they are often referred to as important models 
“for indigenous self-governance and participation in decision-making that could 
inspire the development of similar institutions elsewhere in the world” (UN 
2011, Art. 37), to use the words of James Anaya, the UN Special Rapporteur on 
the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people 
(see also, e.g., Hocking 2005). 
In this article, our aim is twofold: first, to describe and compare the three 
Sámediggis, with a focus both on their legal and formal position within the 
national political system in the respective country, and on their representa-
tive systems. Previous research has shown that these factors affect the actual 
influence and autonomy of the Sámediggis (see e.g., Josefsen 2007; Josefsen, 
Mörkenstam and Saglie 2015; Robbins 2011, 2015). Taking this descriptive part 
as our starting-point, the second aim is to critically analyse the Sámediggis’ 
capacity to actually safeguard the Sámi right to self-determination. We will do 
this by identifying three distinct problems in implementing indigenous self-de-
termination: 1) how a popularly elected indigenous parliament that successfully 
gains political autonomy and influence through participation in national politics 
and institutions always runs the risk of being set aside on matters of conflict 
with the nation-state (Norway); 2) how the historical legacy of a divide and 
rule government policy may justify continued paternalistic state politics by per-
petuating power relations within the indigenous community (Sweden); and 3) 
how conflicts between an indigenous people and the state in which they live 
on the right to define the people may delimit the right to self-determination 
and further conflicts between groups claiming indigenous status (Finland). Our 
more general research questions are two: Should the Nordic Sámediggis serve as 
a model for indigenous self-determination in an international perspective? And 
what are the main obstacles to Sámi self-determination in the three countries?
The Nordic Sámediggis: so similar, so different
The development of the Sámediggis could be understood as a form of policy 
diffusion from one country to another, in this case first from Finland to Norway 
and Sweden, and then from Norway to Sweden and back to Finland (see e.g., 
Eriksson 1997). The Sámi Delegation (Saamelaisvaltuuskunta), established in 
Finland as early as 1973, was important for the initial development in the two 
11
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other countries, since there already existed one form of popularly elected insti-
tution for Sámi representation. One of the Swedish State’s main arguments for 
establishing “a Swedish Sámi representative body” was, for instance, the fact 
that “such a body already exists in Finland […]” (SOU 1989:41, 150).4 Finland 
had as early as 1949 appointed a State Committee on Lapp Affairs,5 and its 
work resulted in recommendations of a new legislative framework to protect 
and develop the economic and cultural position of the Sámi as a distinct ethnic 
minority. Although nothing came out of the committee’s proposal, a second 
State Committee was appointed in 1971 resulting in the establishment of the 
Sámi Delegation (Müller-Wille 1979; Sillanpää 1994). It was primarily created 
as an advisory body to the Finnish Government, created by a Cabinet Decree. 
Its legal status was as a committee with the mandate “to oversee the rights of 
the Sami population and to make recommendations to the Finnish authorities” 
(Sillanpää 1994, 114). Thus, it had no decision-making power. Its purpose was 
to promote the economic, social and cultural conditions of the Sámi on certain 
specified matters, for instance on environmental protection, reindeer herding, 
exploitation of natural resources and the use of water resources in the Sámi 
homeland, and it should introduce a Sámi curriculum for education (Müller-
Wille 1979). 
Although the Sámi Delegation could serve as a model for both Norway and 
Sweden, the political development in the 1980’s—starting with the appointment 
of Sámi Rights Commissions in 1980 and 1982 respectively, on which both state 
representatives and Sámi organisations participated—was, however, caused 
by two different courses of events on a national level (Josefsen, Mörkenstam 
and Saglie 2015). In Norway, the conflict around the damming of the Alta/
Kautokeino River in the 1970s and early 1980s put Sámi rights on the national 
political agenda in an unprecedented way. According to the initial plans, the 
dam would flood a Sámi village and huge land areas, with consequences es-
pecially for reindeer grazing. Opposition escalated into massive acts of civil 
disobedience, and these actions made headlines all over the world. The official 
Norwegian policy of human rights abroad was set in stark contrast to the lack 
of rights for its own indigenous people at home (Semb 2001). The national and 
international focus on this issue more or less forced the Norwegian government 
4  SOU is an abbreviation of Statens Offentliga Utredningar, Swedish Government Official Reports.
5  The term “lapp” is originally a Finnish term historically used by others to refer to the Sámi. The term is not recog-
nised by the Sámi, since it was (and still is) often used in a derogatory way by non-Sámi. It was gradually abandoned 
in official government documents during the 1960s and 70s. 
12
Gáldu Čála, No. 1/2016
into dialogue with Sámi representatives, and after the conflict the Sámi came out 
stronger than before, something that had a great impact on their influence on the 
work of the Rights Commission. 
In the Swedish national context, it was the Supreme Court ruling in the Taxed 
Mountain Case that forced the government to initiate a Sámi Rights Commission 
(Lantto and Mörkenstam 2015). The Taxed Mountain Case was initiated by 
Sámiid Riikkasearvi (Svenska Samernas Riksförbund, SSR/the National Union 
of the Swedish Sámi) in 1966, when some Sámi communities and individual 
Sámi in the county of Jämtland sued the Swedish State and claimed ownership 
of the reindeer grazing areas in the Taxed Mountains (Skattefjällen). Although 
in 1981 the Supreme Court decided in favour of the State as the rightful owner 
of the property in dispute, the court’s ruling was also interpreted in terms of a 
strengthened legal position on the part of reindeer herders. The Swedish State, 
therefore, appointed a Sámi Rights Commission in 1982 to further investigate 
the rights of the reindeer herders and how they could be guaranteed in legislation. 
In contrast to Norway, however, the Sámi had lost their legal process against the 
State. Swedish politicians and parties had not been compelled to confront their 
own policies, leaving the Swedish Sámi in a weaker position when they started 
work in the Sámi Rights Commission in comparison to the Norwegian Sámi 
(see e.g., Josefsen, Mörkenstam and Saglie 2015). 
The development in Finland differed significantly from the other two 
countries, since the Sámi already had a popularly elected representative body, 
the Sámi Delegation, as mentioned above. In 1990 the Advisory Council on 
Sámi Affairs presented a legislative proposal on a Sámi Act that would restore 
the rights of the Sámi to land and water and to create conditions for the Sámi 
to develop their culture, language, and social and economic situation. In this 
proposal, it was further recommended that these long-term objectives should be 
realised by strengthening the position of the Sámi Delegation. The proposal was 
harshly criticised and no legislation strengthening Sámi rights followed, but in 
1995 the Finnish national parliament, the Eduskunta, enacted the Finnish Act on 
the Sámi Parliament (Act 974/1995), in which the Sámi representative body—
now called the Sámediggi—got a similar institutional design as the parliaments 
already  established in Norway and Sweden (Sillanpää 2002).
In this latter development, then, the Norwegian Sámi Rights Commission 
was continuously ahead in presenting its results and in initiating various legis-
lative changes. The short time lag between the work of the commissions did not 
allow for anything to be learnt from the Norwegian policy choices in Finland 
13
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and Sweden. However, the mere fact that Norway established a Sámediggi put 
political pressure on the other two countries, although in different ways: Sweden 
had to create a completely new institution in order not to put the Swedish Sámi 
in a worse off position than its neighbouring countries; in Finland it was about 
re-shaping an already existing institution with a weak legal position and limited 
mandate. The development in the Nordic countries can thus be understood as a 
process of emulation “whereby policies diffuse because of their normative and 
socially constructed properties instead of their objective characteristics” (Gilardi 
2012, 22). The policy change in one country (Norway) influenced the decisions 
made later on in the other countries in a way that could best be described as 
mimicking (see e.g., Schaltegger and Küttel 2002): Sweden and Finland copied 
the Norwegian original idea, it was a “blueprint strategy” (Eriksson 1997, 163). 
Although the Norwegian idea of a popularly elected representative body 
was copied in both Finland and Sweden, the three Sámediggis differ in many 
aspects: in their legal bases, formal position and in their mandate, as well as in 
their systems of representation.
The legal bases of the Sámediggis
International law and the legal status of the Sámi as an indigenous people 
were the explicit foundations for the establishment of a Sámediggi in all three 
countries. The Sámi had both nationally and in an extended Nordic coopera-
tion after WWII—especially in and through the establishment of a Nordic Sámi 
Council (today the Sámi Council, a non-governmental organisation made up of 
Sámi member organisations from Finland, Norway, Russia and Sweden), with 
the first two conferences held in 1953 and 1956—emphasised that the Sámi are 
one people divided by the borders of four nation-states. This early mobilisation 
on a Nordic level also led to an increased international engagement and the 
Sámi Council participated actively in the establishment of the World Council of 
Indigenous Peoples as well as in international debate and in organisations like 
the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (see e.g., Heininen 2002; 
Robbins 2011). In spite of the argument emphasised in the international arena 
that the Sámi are one people, the Sámi and the Sámediggis have different legal 
standing in the three Nordic countries.
If we compare the constitutional recognition of the Sámi as a people, all three 
countries have recognised a specific status of the Sámi in their constitutions 
but in different ways. The strongest form of recognition is to be found in the 
Constitution of Finland, in which the Sámi have been explicitly recognised as 
14
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an indigenous people since 1999: “The Sami, as an indigenous people […] have 
the right to maintain and develop their own language and culture”, and in “their 
native region, the Sami have linguistic and cultural self-government, as provided 
by an Act” (Constitution of Finland, Act 731/1999, Ch. 2, Art. 17, Ch. 11, Art. 
121). In Norway the constitution was amended in 1988 with a paragraph stating 
that the “authorities of the state shall create conditions enabling the Sami people 
to preserve and develop its language, culture and way of life” (Constitution of 
Norway, Ch. E, Art 108). In Sweden the Sámi were recognised constitutionally 
much later, in 2010, when it was stated in the Instrument of Government that 
the “opportunities of the Sámi people and ethnic, linguistic and religious mi-
norities to preserve and develop a cultural and social life of their own shall be 
promoted” (SFS 2010:1408, Ch. 1, Art. 2).6
The legal bases of the Sámediggis differ as well, as is easily illustrated by 
comparing the legislative mandate of the parliaments. In the first paragraph of 
the Finnish Act on the Sámi Parliament the status of the Sámi as an indige-
nous people is emphasised: “The Sámi, as an indigenous people, have linguis-
tic and cultural autonomy in the Sámi homeland as provided for in this Act 
and in other legislation” (Act 974/1995, Ch.1, Art. 1). In the first section of 
the Norwegian Sámi Act (in which chapter two includes provisions regarding 
the Sámi Parliament), it is stated that the Act should “enable the Sami people 
in Norway to safeguard and develop their language, culture and way of life” 
(Act of 12 June 1987 No. 56, §1-1). The first paragraph in the Swedish Act 
differs significantly: “[in] this Act provisions are made for a special government 
agency – the Sámi Parliament [...]” (SFS 1992:1433, §1). 
Both the Norwegian and Finnish Acts give the Sámediggis a broader scope of 
responsibilities in comparison with the Swedish Act. In Norway, the Sámediggi 
have a responsibility regarding “any matter that in the view of the Sámi Parliament 
particularly affects the Sámi people” (Act of 12 June 1987 No. 56, §2-1). In 
Finland, the task for the Sámediggi “is to look after the Sámi language and 
culture, as well as to take care of matters relating to their status as an indigenous 
people” (Act 974/1995, Ch.5, Art. 1). This is in sharp contrast to the Swedish 
Act, which states that the Sámediggi’s main function is to “monitor issues related 
to Sámi culture in Sweden” (SFS 1992:1433, §1). Furthermore, the Finnish 
Act states that “[t]he authorities shall negotiate with the Sámi Parliament in all 
far-reaching and important measures which may directly and in a specific way 
6 SFS is an abbreviation of Svensk författningssamling, the Swedish Code of Statutes
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affect the status of the Sámi as an indigenous people” (Act 974/1995, Ch. 9, Art. 
1). In the Norwegian Sámi Act the role of the Sámediggi as a consultative body 
is formulated somewhat more weakly: other administrative authorities “ought 
to grant the Sámi Parliament the possibility to comment before decisions made 
on issues within the Sámi Parliament’s mandate” (Act of 12 June 1987 No. 56, 
§2-2). Government agencies should thus ask the Sámediggi to give a statement 
on matters concerning Sámi affairs. In the Swedish legislation, however, there 
is no similar formulation.
If we only look into the legal bases of the Sámediggis, the Sámi in Finland 
seem to “have the strongest statutory rights” (Josefsen 2010, 8). However, these 
formal rights have not been institutionalised in political practice. The Swedish 
parliament is clearly the weakest in terms of formal rights, and its legal position 
as a government agency is made explicit in the Sámi Parliament Act. The estab-
lishment of the Swedish Sámediggi was explicitly explained and justified as a 
way of guaranteeing the Sámi people cultural autonomy without simultaneously 
creating a body for political self-determination. The Sámediggi was thus con-
structed as a government agency with special expertise in reindeer husbandry 
issues (Lawrence and Mörkenstam 2016). The dual role as both representa-
tive body and administrative authority is, however, not unique to the Swedish 
Sámediggi, but the balance between these two functions differs radically. In the 
establishment of both the Finnish and Norwegian parliaments, the emphasis 
was on the parliaments’ functions as advisory bodies. The Norwegian or Finnish 
Government has no formal right to rule over the Sámediggi, and can, for 
instance, not force administrative tasks on to the Sámediggi, only delegate tasks 
after approval by the elected representatives. In Norway the relationship with 
the Norwegian authorities has involved a dynamic process where the Sámediggi 
has gradually assumed a stronger and more independent position (Josefsen 
2011). This stands in stark contrast to the position of the Sámediggi in Sweden. 
The formal subordination of the Swedish Sámediggi can be exemplified by the 
decision of the Swedish Government in 2007 to transfer new administrative 
tasks with regard to reindeer husbandry from other government agencies to the 
Sámediggi, despite explicit opposition from a unanimous plenary (Lawrence & 
Mörkenstam 2016).
The differences in legal status—in both theory and practice—is also 
amplified by the huge difference in resources granted the Sámediggis in the 
three countries. The Sámediggis have similar compositions and consist of three 
distinct parts: a popularly elected plenary, a board and a secretariat. In Norway 
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the plenary consists of 39 elected members of parliament (MP) and approxi-
mately 150 employees work in the secretariat. The total 2016 budget of the par-
liament is nearly 46 million Euro (Sametinget 2015). Since 1999 government 
funding has been through block grants, leaving the decision on how to allocate 
funds within the set budget to the parliament itself (KRD 2000). In practice, 
however, the room for new priorities and the economic leeway is not extensive 
due to previous Sámediggi decisions, which tie up larger parts of the budget. 
In contrast, the Swedish Sámediggi consists of 31 elected MPs and around 52 
full-time staff members work in its secretariat. In 2015, the budget amounted 
to around 21 million Euro. The funding is clearly tied to the parliament’s tasks 
as a government agency, manifested in the fact that most of the grants, approx-
imately 14 million Euro, were earmarked for transfer payments and compensa-
tions, like predator compensation for reindeer herders (Sametinget 2016). The 
corresponding figures in Finland are 21 MPs and about 40 employees in the 
secretariat, and the lowest total budget of all three parliaments: the State grants 
the Sámediggi around 6.6 million Euro (www.samediggi.fi). 
Another major legal difference between the countries is that in 1990 Norway, 
in contrast to both Sweden and Finland, was the first country in the world to ratify 
the 1989 ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries (C169). This does not only entail a stronger recognition of the histori-
cal rights to land, water and other natural resources as an indigenous people, but 
the convention also provides, as Patrick Thornberry (2002, 9) argues, a “platform 
from which to argue”, as “indigenous groups are not—compared to States—
securely positioned in the pantheon of international institutions.” In Norway 
the development has also followed a path in the direction of strengthening the 
political influence and autonomy of the Sámediggi, and two key reforms have 
been implemented, in which C169 has been of great importance for the process 
as well as the substance. The first is the Finnmark Act from 2005, relating to 
the management of natural resources in the traditional Sámi settlement area of 
Finnmark County “for the benefit of the residents of the county and particularly 
as a basis for Sámi culture, reindeer husbandry, use of non-cultivated areas, 
commercial activity and social life” (Act of 17 June 2005 No. 85: §a). One of 
the reasons behind this new legislation was that the Norwegian State could no 
longer with certainty claim ownership to land and water in Finnmark due to the 
legal development both domestically and in international law. The land previ-
ously owned by the State was thus transferred to the Finnmark Estate, a new 
local owner where the Sámediggi and the Finnmark County Council appoints 
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three members each to the board. To address the central issue of land and water 
rights within Finnmark, the law mandated the establishment of a commission 
to investigate, identify and protect land and water rights in Finnmark, as well 
as it established a Land Court in order to resolve any disputes arising from the 
commission’s investigations (see e.g., Broderstad 2008; Hernes 2008; Josefsen 
2008).
The ratification of C169 was thus an important part of a wider Norwegian 
recognition of the historical Sámi rights to land, water, and natural resources 
in their capacity of being an indigenous people. No similar recognition exists 
in Finland or Sweden. Another important difference concerning rights to land, 
water and natural resources is the specific right to herd reindeer, i.e. a monopoly 
on reindeer herding granted to Norwegian and Swedish Sámi. In Finland the 
right to herd reindeer is granted to anyone, no matter what their ethnic origin, 
living in the traditional reindeer grazing area; “in fact, more non-Saami than 
Saami in Finland practice reindeer husbandry” (Sillanpää, 2002, 91).
The second major Norwegian reform carried out in full compliance with C169 
involves the consultative arrangements institutionalised by a formal agreement 
between the State and the Norwegian Sámediggi, which guarantees the Sámi 
participation in decision-making processes in all matters that may affect Sámi 
interests (KRD 2005, Art. 1-8; See also e.g., Broderstad and Hernes 2008). The 
agreement thus gave the Sámediggi a better opportunity to influence national 
policy than before (FAD 2011). There are, however, many challenges in effec-
tuating the agreement, and there have been several cases where agreement has 
been reached but where ministries have changed the outcome afterwards (see 
e.g., Sámediggi 2006).
So far, we have seen some important differences in the legal bases of the 
Sámediggis, and it is obvious that the translation of Sámediggi into the English 
word ‘parliament’ may be quite misleading, since none of the parliaments have 
any legislative power. However, to understand the potential of the parliaments 
as models for indigenous self-determination, we will briefly compare them as 
representative bodies.
The Sámediggis as representative bodies of the Sámi people
The Sámediggis are the representative body of the Sámi people in Finland, 
Norway and Sweden respectively. As such, a collective public Sámi will and 
Sámi interests ought to be articulated in and through elections on a national 
level. The electoral systems vary between the countries, however, as well as 
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the system for representation. For instance, in both Finland and Sweden the 
entire country comprises a single constituency, whereas the elections in Norway 
take place in seven multi-member constituencies, affecting the geographical 
representation differently in each country. Another difference is to be found 
in how the people ought to be represented: through candidates belonging to 
political parties (Norway), through casting a vote directly on a person with a 
private candidacy (Finland), or through a party system where personal votes 
have a considerable impact (Sweden). There are several other differences in the 
electoral system, but here we will focus on one; the electoral roll and how to 
define a person with the right to vote. 
In the creation of the Sámediggis, one of the most important questions was 
how to define the persons with a right to vote. This was not something particu-
lar for the Sámediggis, indigenous rights usually presume a basic delimitation 
of whom to include in the people, and the nation-states’ criteria applied to des-
ignating particular individuals as “indigenous” often come into conflict with 
indigenous peoples’ own definition (see e.g., Corntassel 2003; Gover 2010). In 
the case of the Sámi in Sweden, there has been no registration of Sámi ethnicity 
in national censuses or other official registers after WWII. In Norway there was 
a census in 1970 when Sámi ethnicity was registered in specific districts in the 
three northernmost counties of Nordland, Troms and Finnmark, but it could not 
have served as a basis for an electoral roll (Aubert 1978). The establishment of 
the Sámediggis thus created a need for some kind of new ethnic demarcation 
in both countries. In Finland, however, in 1962 “a separate census of the Sami 
was carried out leading to the Sami Registry and the inclusion of the Sami as 
an ethnic group […] in the national census since 1970” (Müller-Wille 1979, 66). 
This “census” was conducted through demographic research, a “questionnaire 
survey” and interviews, conducted by the Sámi Council (Lehtola 2005). Based 
on who had confirmed that at least one of his/her grandparents had spoken Sami 
as their first language, the data was used to put together a voter registry for a 
test election to the Sámi Delegation in 1972 (Joona 2012). Following this test, 
the data was established as the foundation for the electoral roll to the Sámi 
Delegation, as well as for its institutional successor, the Sámediggi. Moreover, 
the same data also formed the basis for the definition of a Sámi Homeland in 
Finland, today consisting of Enontekis, Enare and Utsjoki municipalities in 
addition to a reindeer herding area in the municipality of Sodankylä. 
In both Norway and Sweden the newly developed criteria defining the right 
to register in the Sámi electoral roll (with a right to vote and to be eligible) were 
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enacted in legislation by the national parliaments after consultations with the 
Sámi. In both countries, the electoral rolls are founded on similar principles: all 
Sámi above the age of 18 can register as voters, if they fulfil two criteria. First, 
there is a criterion on self-declared identity: to register a person must declare that 
they regard themselves as Sámi. Second, there is an objective language-based 
criterion: the applicant or one of their parents or grandparents (after a legislative 
amendment in Norway in 1997, it is sufficient with one great-grandparent), must 
have used Sámi as a home language. Alternatively, one of the parents must be 
(or have been) registered on the electoral roll (see e.g., Josefsen, Mörkenstam 
and Saglie 2015). In Finland the criteria are different through the addition of 
one more objective criterion. The right to register is granted to a person “who 
considers himself a Sámi, provided: (1) That he himself or at least one of his 
parents or grandparents has learnt Sámi as his first language; or (2) That he is a 
descendent of a person who has been entered in a land, taxation or population 
register as a mountain, forest or fishing Lapp; or (3) That at least one of his 
parents has or could have been registered as an elector for an election to the 
Sámi Delegation or the Sámi Parliament” (Act 974/1995, Ch.1, Art. 3). 
In Sweden and in Norway the electoral rolls are systems for voter registration, 
not official registers of the Sámi population. The enrolment is voluntary, and Sámi 
may choose not to register, for instance, if they simply do not care about politics, 
or dislike the Sámediggi, but many Sámi also see electoral registration primarily 
as a way of expressing their Sámi identity (Bergh and Saglie 2011; Dahlberg and 
Mörkenstam 2016a). In Finland, however, the electoral roll is claimed to be seen 
rather as a register that gives an enrolled person a formal Sámi status (Joona 
2015). Ever since the inauguration of the Sámediggi the enrolment criteria have 
been one of the most controversial issues within the Sámi community, between 
Sámi and people who claim to be Sámi, and in relation to the Finnish State 
(see e.g., Aikio and Åhrén 2014; T. Joona 2013; Junka-Aikio 2016; Sarivaara, 
Uusiautti and Määttä 2013). We return to this debate in Finland below. In the 
other two countries the criteria have not caused too much debate, although back 
in 1989 one Sámi organisation in Sweden, Landsförbundet Svenska Samer 
(LSS/The Swedish Sámi National Union), criticised the legislative proposal 
from the Sámi Rights Commission as too narrow. The organisation wanted to 
add a criterion—that their origin is Sámi—due to the fact that the Swedish as-
similation policy at the end of the nineteenth century had bereft many Sámi of 
their language and thus the language related three-generation criterion was not 
sufficient (Fjellström et al 2016; Lantto and Mörkenstam 2016).
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To sum up this descriptive part, our comparison shows that the three 
Sámediggis are different in many vital respects despite the similarities between 
the Nordic countries and the obvious policy diffusion. Although the Finnish 
Sámediggi seems to have the strongest legal foundation and the widest mandate, 
it is in practice the weakest followed by the Swedish (see e.g., Robbins 2011, 
2015). The Norwegian Sámediggi is without doubt the most powerful, and since 
its inauguration it has continuously increased its autonomy and influence, for 
instance, as manifested in the Finnmark Act and the formal consultative ar-
rangement with the Norwegian State, supported by the early Norwegian ratifica-
tion on C169 (see e.g., Josefsen, Mörkenstam and Saglie 2015). The difference in 
political capacity based on the status and legal bases of the Sámediggis is further 
exacerbated by the disparities in financial resources. In terms of the system of 
representation, the Sámediggis have their specific characteristics as well, espe-
cially the criteria for defining Sámi with the right to register in the electoral roll. 
In the following, we will take this descriptive comparison as our start-
ing-point in defining three problems facing the different Sámediggis delimiting 
their recognised right to self-determination. These problems are, however, not 
unique to the Sámi; rather, they are problems indigenous peoples are facing all 
over the world in their struggle for self-determination. The Nordic countries’ 
common answer to live up to Sámi right claims—the Sámediggis—just brings 
these problems to the fore. 
“Breaking-in”: between political autonomy 
and the risk of being set aside
When the Norwegian king formally inaugurated the Sámediggi in 1989, it was 
generally regarded as a confirmation from the State that the parliament was 
an authoritative voice on Sámi issues. The support from the royal family also 
enhanced the Sámediggi’s legitimacy among those Sámi who feared that this 
new representative body was going to promote Sámi radicalism and separatism; 
rather, it has turned out to be the opposite. The Sámediggi in Norway has from 
the start prioritised its relationship with the State, not with the aim of separat-
ing from the State, but to make the State accountable for the consequences of 
its policy regarding the Sámi (Josefsen 2014; Magga 2014; Nystø 2014). For 
more than a hundred years the State had been seeking to erase Sámi culture and 
belonging (see e.g., Minde 2005; Pedersen 1999), and even though the policy 
changed radically after WWII, the consequences were still very much present 
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in 1989. The Sámi languages, culture and way of life was virtually inviable in 
general areas in society; in media, schools, local and regional politics, health 
services, et cetera. 
During its first term of office the main objective of the Sámediggi was to 
ensure that economic subsidy schemes were transferred from other ministries 
to the new institution. This strategy was, however, gradually de-emphasised 
when it materialised that the government did not just hand over its general re-
sponsibility for Sámi initiatives along with the necessary economic resources, 
but that the Sámediggi also ran the risk of becoming an administrative body 
for the government. Instead, the parliament focused its efforts on implement-
ing Sámi rights into laws and formal regulations making the State responsible 
for including Sámi aspects in all corners of public initiatives and responsibili-
ties. This also involved making sure that the Sámediggi’s tasks were defined by 
the Norwegian parliament, the Storting, instead of the government (Broderstad 
2008). In parallel to this, the Sámediggi worked to increase the state-transferred 
budgets in order to take on the adopted administrative tasks and to bring about 
economic leeway. This line of politics aimed at developing a model of self-de-
termination within the state borders based on dialogue and cooperation, where 
there was a “shared” responsibility for strengthening Sámi culture (Josefsen 
2014). But is this really a form of indigenous self-determination and, if so, what 
does this form of self-determination actually imply? What features does the 
Sámediggi’s approach towards the state steering system have, and what kind of 
advantages and disadvantages might this involve? To answer these questions, 
we will start with the dispute between a Norwegian minister and the Sámediggi 
in 1994 over a mining company prospecting for minerals. 
Although the Sámi Act clearly states that the Sámediggi is free to raise any 
issue that is regarded relevant for the Sámi people, the first significant test of 
the parliament’s autonomy came in 1994, five years after its establishment. The 
mining company Rio Tinto Zink started prospecting for minerals in a traditional 
Sámi settlement area near the community of Karasjok and on land where Sámi 
land rights had not been clarified. The Sámediggi had not been informed in 
advance of this prospecting project. The President of the Sámediggi, Ole Henrik 
Magga—along with a national television crew—entered the prospecting site, 
where he gave a statement expressing the fact that the Sámi had not granted 
the company any right to start prospecting and he demanded an immediate 
stop to all activities (Brantenberg 1995). This symbolic action was broadcasted 
nationally and resulted in the Minister of Municipal Affairs declaring that the 
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President of the Sámediggi had acted illegally, stating that he had no authority 
to make such demands. The President’s response was: “If I, as the Sámediggi 
President, am to be prohibited from responding to such things as what is now 
happening in Karasjok, it is simply sensational. If so, the Sámediggi might just 
as well be shutdown” (Magga, in Nordlys 1994). In the aftermath, the Minister 
acknowledged the Sámediggi and its representatives the right to express disa-
greement with the government and did admit that the political process of not 
involving the Sámediggi had been poor (Norwegian Parliament 1994). This 
statement made it clear that it was the Sámediggi itself who defined and decided 
upon its own policy and action, not the government. Furthermore, in spite of 
not having any official authority on the matter, the Sámediggi’s action and use 
of symbolic power resulted in a complete shutdown of the prospecting by the 
mining company. The parliament’s role as a representative voice for the Sámi 
people was elucidated, and its autonomy was demonstrated irrespective of the 
Norwegian government’s position.  
Another important example of the Sámediggi’s strategy was the signing of 
the consultation agreement, mentioned above, between the government and the 
Sámediggi in 2005. It was a result of a two-year consultation period between the 
Norwegian Parliament Justice Committee and the Sámediggi on the Finnmark 
Act. The Finnmark Act is an act in a long row of acts, for instance, regarding 
education, language, health, traditional industry, cultural heritage and Sámi 
culture in general, in which different Sámi rights are included and set out in 
paragraphs (Broderstad 2008; Josefsen 2014). These are not specific Sámi acts, 
but acts in which Sámi rights are included, either on a general level and in the 
objectives, or in a more detailed manner. It is then up to the public administra-
tion to concretise the content of the legal aims, and in this context the consulta-
tion agreement secures the Sámediggi a formal platform to participate in such 
processes.
In addition, the Sámediggi has also gained new tasks in management rights. 
The passing of the Planning and Building Act is an example here. The Norwegian 
planning authorities are responsible for informing and including other admin-
istrative bodies in their work, including the Sámediggi. This is especially sig-
nificant in terms of local planning in municipalities where Sámi culture must 
now be included in all planning (Broderstad and Josefsen 2016). Like other 
administrative authorities, the Sámediggi can forward formal objections if the 
local planning does not consider Sámi interests. When it comes to implement-
ing legal rights in general on the regional and local level, the Sámediggi has 
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initiated agreements with all the county authorities covering the area where the 
Sámi traditionally have lived, as well as with the City Council of Oslo (the 
capital of Norway) and the City Council of Tromsø, and are aiming at entering 
more agreements locally.  
These brief examples illustrate what has been called a “breaking-in” approach, 
characterised by a political leadership in the Sámediggi insisting on political 
autonomy, and at the same time prioritising the translation of Sámi rights into 
Norwegian law and entering into cooperation agreements with other public au-
thorities (Josefsen 2014). It is definitely the opposite of a “breaking-out” policy, 
which has the aim of having self-determination through territorial self-rule. A 
“breaking-in” approach is thus a way of understanding how Sámi self-determi-
nation can come into being without it being delimited to a specific Sámi territory.
For this approach to be successful, however, a premise is that it is met by a 
plural integration approach from the State (Josefsen 2014). Since 1989, Sámi 
politics has grown to become a more natural part of the Norwegian society in 
general, especially in the northern part of the country (Selle et al 2015). Sámi 
representatives participate in many different arenas both internationally, nation-
ally, regionally and locally, seeking to influence Norwegian decision-makers in 
politics, bureaucracy, industry and academia. This form of self-determination 
can be interpreted in terms of relational autonomy, i.e. to have the freedom, 
legitimacy and resources to participate on an equal basis with other public au-
thorities on all levels, challenging and debating the majority-minority position 
(see e.g., Keating 2012; Kingsbury 2001). Sometimes there is an expressed frus-
tration of being seen but not heard, on other occasions Sámi representatives 
contribute to the agenda setting. 
Another major precondition for genuine dialogue and consultation is that 
knowledge and understanding of the Sámi people must increase in Norwegian 
society in order to combat the myths and prejudices prevalent among political 
and administrative decision-makers. Such a development has also been discern-
ible in recent decades since the Sámi have become publicly visible, not least due 
to the work of the Sámediggi and Sámi politicians. However, the politicians and 
Sámi issues are most visible on a daily basis the further north you go in Norway 
(Skogerbø, Josefsen and Vestli 2015). This development has resulted in a sense 
of pride among the Sámi, overcoming the historical suppression and devalua-
tion of the Sámi languages, culture and way of life inflicting a sense of shame 
about being Sámi. Dialogue and increased knowledge and understanding of the 
plural Sámi way of living remove the need for exotifying oneself in the eyes of 
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others. Instead of essentialising Sámi culture, where only the most spectacular 
and alien parts are highlighted, participation in defining the public Sámi image 
may prevent an objectification of Sámi culture (Josefsen 2014). The concrete 
content of the Norwegian State’s Sámi policy can thereby target the actual needs 
of the Sámi as defined by and among themselves. The steady increase in the 
number of Sámi registering in the electoral roll—from 5,505 in 1989 to 15,356 
in 2015—could be interpreted as an indication that the Sámediggi is seen as the 
prime vehicle for this development. 
However, politics is about power relations and the Norwegian government 
will always hold the strongest hand within this form of self-determination, 
clearly exemplified by the long dispute with the Sámediggi over the handling 
of Sámi fishing rights (Pedersen 2014). In 1990, Norway introduced a vessel 
quota system in sea fisheries; a system that would privatise fishing rights and 
systematically exclude Sámi fishers, since they were small-scale, part-time and 
seasonal. In 2008, there seemed to be a “light at the end of the tunnel” when the 
government appointed a coastal fishing committee, which after thorough inves-
tigation and documentation confirmed the historical existence of Sámi fisheries 
alongside other small-scale fisheries in the fiords and on the coast; historical 
rights and indigenous human rights were thus present. The committee also 
forwarded proposals in terms of a new legal framework and management regime 
(Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries 2008). Despite the documentation 
and consultations with the Sámediggi, however, “the government stands firm on 
the issue of historic, indigenous rights pertaining to fishery: in the government’s 
view there are none” (Jentoft 2011, 104). The government thus refused the idea 
that the Sea Sámi and their fisheries have protection under indigenous human 
rights, or any foundation in immemorial usage (Pedersen 2014).
The question regarding Sámi fishery rights is an example of how the 
Norwegian authorities may choose to unilaterally disregard any dialogue with 
the Sámediggi representatives and any systematically gathered knowledge on 
Sámi rights. This dependence on the government is reinforced by the fact that 
the budget is not a part of the consultation agreement, which means that the 
government’s budget bill is passed onto the Storting without previous consulta-
tions with the Sámediggi about their needs. In comparison to the state budget as 
a whole, the budget for Sámi issues and initiatives has not had any real growth 
over the last few years (Fjellheim 2016). The lack of full economic independ-
ence means that the Sámediggi in Norway do not enjoy full political autonomy 
(Selle et al 2015; Selle and Falck 2015).
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An important external variable affecting the on-going work of the Sámediggi 
and Sámi politicians is—like in all democracies—the shifting political majority 
in the national parliament. With a change in the majority situation within the 
Storting, it is not necessarily the case that all political majorities will respect or 
support the agreements already established. There are indications that may point 
in such a direction in Norway. The present government consists of two parties, 
of which one, Fremskrittspartiet (the Progress Party), has a party programme 
stating that they want to shut down the Sámediggi. 
The development in Norwegian Sámi politics in the last few years, with what 
seems to be a regress on indigenous rights (or at least a status quo), leaves us 
with two questions: is this a passing phenomenon, or a more permanent position 
of the Norwegian government, and why would this political change occur at 
this time? We will conclude this part by developing a few possible answers 
to the latter question. One hypothesis is that Norway as a rich oil producing 
country is no longer dependent on an international reputation as a human 
rights defender and promoter. If so, the need to uphold an indigenous people’s 
human rights at home will therefore be less important. Another possible expla-
nation is an argument based on national economics: there are strong interest 
groups lobbying for their economic interests in traditional Sámi areas. A state 
upholding indigenous peoples’ human rights to natural recourses would imply 
that the Sámi would have a right to not be excluded in terms of property rights 
to natural resources based on customary and immemorial usage (Macpherson 
1977, in Jentoft 2011). The status of indigenous may come into conflict with 
other powerful interests in exploiting natural resources. 
One might, however, also turn to the Sámediggi itself. Contemporary politics 
might indicate that the Sámediggi’s political competence has weakened over 
recent years. However, the level of political activity and initiatives, the number 
of experienced politicians in combination with a large and educated administra-
tion, do not seem to support that explanation; on the contrary. It might be that the 
Sámediggi is too skilled and powerful, and may have gained too much influence 
and autonomy in the eyes of the dominant Norwegian society. Its success in in-
fluencing regional and local policies may have created a counter reaction in the 
Norwegian political parties—nationally, regionally and locally—and they are 
now trying to restore their earlier power position. 
These are all possible explanations that should be investigated further in 
terms of understanding what forces are in play when the implementation of in-
digenous rights faces well-established structures of power distribution.
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Divide and rule: the legislative construction 
of different categories of Sámi
In comparison to the Norwegian Sámediggi there is no doubt that the devel-
opment in Sweden is less promising, if we analyse the Sámediggi’s autonomy 
and political influence in contemporary politics. The early institutional choice 
in Sweden to establish a government agency rather than a representative 
body seems to have had a decisive affect. The formal position of the Swedish 
Sámediggi as a government agency clearly hampers its work, and creates a 
potential and often real conflict between safeguarding the interests of the Sámi 
people on the one hand, and the interests of the Swedish government on the 
other (Josefsen, Mörkenstam and Saglie 2015). The dual roles run the risk of 
hollowing the legitimacy of the parliament both in relation to its own constit-
uency (see e.g., Holmberg 2016; Nilsson and Möller 2016) and in relation to 
the State (Lawrence and Mörkenstam 2016). Moreover, the construction of the 
Sámediggi primarily as a government agency with administrative tasks has been 
reinforced since its inauguration, even after the government in 2006 for the first 
time recognised the Sámi people as a people with a right to self-determination 
in accordance with international law.
The Swedish State’s reluctance to increase the autonomy and influence of the 
Sámediggi is also supported by the common description of the daily work in the 
parliament in terms of its political turmoil and instability. In Swedish media this 
instability is most often described as caused by persistent conflicts between the 
political parties and an unwillingness to compromise, or as effects of personal 
antagonisms between the elected members of the Sámediggi (Mörkenstam, 
Gottardis and Roth, 2012). The conflict ridden parliament has also been topical 
in Sámi society, and in an electoral study conducted in conjunction with the 
Sámediggi election in 2013 it was one of the main reasons not to vote according 
to the non-voting respondents (the main reason for 11 percent) (Dahlberg and 
Mörkenstam 2016a). Moreover, in interviews on how the parties organise 
their nomination of candidates before the election, some of the representatives 
mentioned “the turbulent length of office”, 2009-2013, as a reason for why the 
parties had a hard time finding willing candidates for the upcoming election 
(Fjellström 2016). In a series of interviews with all MPs conducted in 2014, 
many of the respondents described the internal conflicts as hampering the work 
of the parliament, especially its capacity to challenge the state policy. Often 
neglected in these discussions is the fact that many of the conflicts and the main 
political cleavage within the Sámediggi originate from Swedish Sámi policy 
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and its historical legacy. Swedish politics could in this perspective be seen as a 
classical strategy of “divide and rule” often used by colonial powers. This tactic 
usually “involved fomenting divisions among subjugated groups by sowing 
mutual mistrust” (Posner, Spear and Vermeule 2010, 451). In this part we will 
discuss this Swedish politics of “divide and rule”, and how it has partitioned 
Sámi society and still affects Sámi politics and the Sámediggi.  
The historical legacy of the Swedish “divide and rule” politics was described 
in the 1960s by the Sámi leader Israel Ruong as a “category-split” of the Sámi 
people (see e.g., Ruong 1982, 187-188). Its origin is to be found in the Swedish 
State’s ambition to order Sámi politics into a coherent legal framework for the 
first time in the second half of the nineteenth century. In this context, two ideas 
were taken for granted: the Sámi did not have any right to self-determination, 
and they had no ownership rights to land, water and other natural resources, 
although such claims were frequently raised by the Sámi (see e.g., Korpijaako-
Labba, 1994; Lantto and Mörkenstam 2016). These ideas were further supported 
by ideas of an alleged racial and cultural superiority of Swedes and Swedish 
culture (a similar hierarchical ideology justified the state policy in Norway as 
well). Hence, Swedish Sámi politics had neither ownership rights nor self-de-
termination in focus in this initial stage; instead, the main task for the govern-
ment was to regulate the relation between different livelihoods, reindeer herding 
and farming. The former customary rights of the Sámi, the rights attached to 
reindeer herding, were to be succeeded by special legislation. The first Reindeer 
Grazing Act from 1886 granted the Sámi an exclusive right to herd reindeer in 
Sweden (a similar right was granted to the Sámi in Norway but not in Finland, as 
mentioned earlier); a right that included a right to hunt, to fish and to forestry on 
Crown land (i.e. on land perceived as owned by the Swedish State). These rights 
did not originate in ownership rights as mentioned above, they were perceived 
as “privileges” granted to the Sámi by the Swedish State (see e.g., Cramér 2000; 
Mörkenstam 1999). 
In the discussions on the first Reindeer Grazing Act and its successors (from 
1898 and 1928), three founding pillars of the “divide and rule” politics were es-
tablished, although not as an effect of long-term strategic or intentional politics, 
it was rather an effect of decisions made while trying to solve political issues on 
a day-to-day basis. First, only reindeer herding was defined as a traditional Sámi 
livelihood; second, only Sámi rights attached to reindeer herding were recog-
nised in legislation; and, third, to be able to practise the right to herd reindeer 
you had to be a member of a reindeer herding community (see e.g., Lantto and 
28
Gáldu Čála, No. 1/2016
Mörkenstam 2016). Sámi occupied in other traditional livelihoods, like hunting 
or fishing, and other potential rights based on immemorial use were in this way 
excluded from the confined system of Sámi rights. Swedish politics was thus 
from the very beginning both narrow in scope (only rights attached to reindeer 
herding were recognised) and excluding (only reindeer herders and members of 
a reindeer herding community could actually make use of these rights). In this 
way, Sámi society was divided into two categories, each with different relations 
to Sámi rights. The legislation had “become a sharp knife” cutting “through 
Sami groups, and separates those who belong together and should form a social 
unity” (Ruoung, quoted in Lantto and Mörkenstam 2015, 144).
The differentiation of the Sámi into two categories was also followed by a 
dual state Sámi policy of both segregation and assimilation, which further re-
inforced the division of the Sámi. The segregation policy was directed towards 
the reindeer herding Sámi with the explicit objective of restraining them from 
getting too close to Swedish society and “civilisation” with its alleged detrimen-
tal effects on reindeer herding. Sámi in other livelihoods, however, were to be 
assimilated as quickly as possible and ought thus not to have any other rights 
than those held by Swedish citizens in general (Mörkenstam 1999). This assim-
ilation policy, which gradually became more active during the first half of the 
twentieth century, forced many Sámi to give up their traditional way of life, and 
many lost their language. After WWII, Swedish politics slowly changed when 
race biology and cultural superiority became impossible as explicit justificato-
ry arguments, and the dual policy towards the Sámi was replaced by an active 
assimilation policy directed towards the reindeer herders with the objective of 
rationalising the reindeer industry and integrating them into the welfare state 
(Lantto and Mörkenstam 2016). 
The Sámi political mobilisation grew stronger after WWII with the estab-
lishment of the first national Sámi organisation, SSR in 1950. SSR criticised 
Swedish politics for being too narrow in focus and too excluding (Lantto and 
Mörkenstam 2015). One tangible result of this critique was the way the State 
came to justify its policy: the political objective was in the 1960s for the first 
time defined in terms of being protection of the cultural and linguistic Sámi 
minority. From this perspective, demands for an expanded and more inclusive 
system of rights ought to have had a reasonable chance of affecting legislation, 
but no major political changes were made. Instead, the State used the cultural 
importance of reindeer herding for a policy which led to status quo. Reindeer 
herding was, it was argued, “a prerequisite for the preservation of Sámi culture” 
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(Prop. 1971:51, 112), since culture and language were considered to be upheld 
by the reindeer herders. The only rights needed were thus the rights already 
granted to the Sámi in order to protect the reindeer industry. The narrow view 
of Sámi rights was reified. In a similar vein, a more inclusive legislation was 
rejected as well: the larger the number of right-holders, “the harder it will be to 
use them [the Sámi rights] in a rational way, and the less they are worth for its 
proper purpose, which is to constitute support for the reindeer industry” (SOU 
1968:16, 92).
With the establishment of SSR the political mobilisation gradually grew 
stronger and SSR managed to create national solidarity among the Sámi, a sol-
idarity that was further strengthened by a parallel organisation on a Nordic and 
international level (Lantto and Mörkenstam 2015). However, since its estab-
lishment SSR had its firmest base in the reindeer herding communities and in 
spite of the ambition to represent all Sámi—not least manifested in the work 
of Ruong—reindeer herding maintained its central position on their political 
agenda (see e.g., Sjölin 2002). With the broader political mobilisation among 
the Sámi after WWII, the heterogeneity among the Sámi, i.e. the category-split, 
became more evident. SSR kept its dominant position in the political mobili-
sation but it came to be challenged by other Sámi organisations mainly repre-
senting the category of Sámi excluded from the system of rights. In 1980 these 
different organisations joined together and formed the LSS (see e.g., Lantto and 
Mörkenstam 2016). Hence, a century after the nascence of the Swedish “divide 
and rule” politics, the Sámi political mobilisation was organised around the 
division originally created by the State. 
The conflictual Swedish Sámediggi must be understood in this perspective. 
Many of the results from an election study conducted in connection with the 
election in 2013 confirms that the category-split still constitutes the main political 
cleavage within the Sámi electorate, and is decisive for voting behaviour as well 
as the party structure. A factor analysis of different political issues on the political 
agenda in the electoral campaign in 2013 showed, for instance, that the opinions 
of the electorate could be sorted into two main dimensions: self-determination 
and the standing and influence of the reindeer herding communities including 
the right to hunt and fish attached to reindeer herding (Nilsson, Mörkenstam and 
Svensson 2016). The first dimension, self-determination, basically illustrated a 
cleavage between the Sámi and the Swedish State; the electorate was united in 
the opinion that the Sámediggi ought to have greater influence and autonomy on 
issues of importance in Sámi society. However, the other dimension concerned 
30
Gáldu Čála, No. 1/2016
an internal cleavage and showed a deeply divided electorate. At one end of the 
spectrum were voters from three parties, who held the firm opinion that the power 
of the reindeer herding communities ought to be reduced, and that all Sámi no 
matter what their livelihood ought to have the same right to fish and hunt. At 
the other end of the spectrum we found voters from two parties, who favoured 
the expansion of the power and influence of the reindeer herding communities, 
and they were less in favour of the idea of extending the right to hunt and fish to 
all Sámi (Nilsson, Mörkenstam and Svensson 2016). Moreover, when the elec-
torate’s opinions on specific political issues were analysed, distinct differences 
could be discerned among the voters of the different parties, which all followed 
a similar pattern. Three political issues had a high explanatory value for the 
probability of voting for a specific party: whether Sweden ought to ratify C169, 
whether non-members of the reindeer herding communities ought to have the 
same rights as members to hunt and fish, and whether the reindeer herding com-
munities ought to have a greater influence (Dahlberg and Mörkenstam 2016b). 
Again, the “divide and rule” politics underlies this political cleavage.
The category-split could be interpreted in terms of creating an interest-based 
Sámi politics, similar to the class voting that has dominated the political landscape 
in Western Europe over the last century, and especially the party structure in the 
Nordic countries and in Sweden (see e.g., Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Oscarsson 
and Holmberg 2011). However, the dual political practice of segregation and 
assimilation following the category-split has affected Sámi politics in a more 
profound way.7 In elections to the Swedish Sámediggi, classical theories in 
political science to explain voter behaviour, like socio-economic factors, have 
no explanatory value at all. Instead, there are other factors specific to Sámediggi 
elections that explain voting behaviour: knowledge of the Sámi languages and 
social integration in Sámi society. Both these factors are at least partially an 
effect of the category-split and the dual policy of segregation and assimila-
tion.8 These factors had a direct impact on voter participation (Dahlberg and 
Mörkenstam 2016a), and an analysis of the composition of voters in the parties 
represented in the Sámediggi showed that knowledge of the Sámi language 
7  It has, for instance, without doubt had a severe impact on the electoral roll. The harsh assimilation policy around 
1900 obviously delimits the possibilities for an unknown number of Sámi that fulfil the subjective criterion—the 
self-declared Sámi identity—to register on the electoral roll (if the language was lost in third generation). 
8  Social integration was measured as an index consisting of five questions that were asked to the electorate in a 
survey in connection with the Sámediggi election in 2013: the respondent’s sense of solidarity with Sápmi and sense 
of solidarity with their locality, whether the respondent’s social fellowship mostly consisted of Sámi or not, whether 
most of the respondent’s friends were registered on the Sámi electoral roll or not, and whether the respondent’s 
growth was in a Sámi environment or not.
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together with social integration in Sámi society were the particular factors that 
could best predict voters’ behaviour (Dahlberg and Mörkenstam 2016b). 
The consequences of this policy can also be seen when we analyse the levels 
of trust among the electorate, both in institutions and in people in general, i.e. 
interpersonal trust. The Sámi electorate have in general a slightly lower level of 
interpersonal trust than the majority population in Sweden, but the differences 
within the Sámi electorate are distinct. Home district, occupation, knowledge of 
any of the Sámi languages and level of social integration within Sámi society 
affects the level of interpersonal trust: it is lower for voters living within the 
traditional Sámi settlement area, who are self-employed, have a high level of 
knowledge in Sámi and a high level of social integration. In addition to this 
picture, only 16 percent of the electorate claim to have a high level of trust in 
the Sámediggi. Compared with the majority population the Sámi electorate also 
has a slightly lower level of trust in national institutions such as the government, 
the Riksdag, and the police. If we link this slightly lower level of institutional 
trust with the results indicating lower level of interpersonal trust in general—
particularly among persons that have a high level of social integration in the 
Sami society and those that are self-employed—a picture of marginalisation and 
distrust towards the majority society emerges (Nilsson and Möller 2016). These 
results are somewhat different from the studies presented in Norway where there 
are no signs of a political marginalisation of the Sámi; rather they are seen as 
tightly integrated in the Norwegian political system (see e.g., Selle et al. 2015).
The low level of institutional trust in the Sámediggi (16 percent) among 
the voters can at least partly be explained by the fact that the parliament lacks 
formal decision-making on most political matters of importance within Sámi 
society, like the right to land and natural resources within Sápmi. In the election 
study from 2013 a majority of the electorate (not dependent on the voters having 
a low or high level of trust in the Sámediggi) wants to see an increase of the 
Sámediggi’s influence on these matters. The conclusion is thus that the distrust 
towards and the low confidence in the Sámediggi is about institutional pow-
erlessness and frustration: the Sámediggi has neither the formal position nor 
the political decision-making power on matters that are important to the voters 
(Nilsson and Möller 2016).
To conclude this part we will emphasise three problems elucidated by our 
analysis, which may have a severe impact on the development of indige-
nous self-determination in contemporary societies. First, the Swedish “divide 
and rule” politics has partitioned the Sámi and cemented political cleavages, 
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which is clearly shown in the political behaviour of the electorate and in the 
Sámediggi’s party structure. This cleavage also affects the power relations 
within the Sámi society, something that became evident in the political debate 
surrounding two of the most important legal cases, in which the courts’ rulings 
confirmed Sámi reindeer herding rights: the Nordmaling case in 2011, and the 
Gírjas case in 2016. In the Nordmaling case, three reindeer herding communities 
were granted rights to use private land for reindeer grazing, which was affirmed 
by the decision of the Swedish Supreme Court. The court thereby affirmed that 
Sámi reindeer herding communities have property rights in the form of usufruc-
tuary rights over land areas traditionally used, but which they today share with 
the majority population (Åhrén 2016; Allard 2015). In the ongoing Gírjas case, 
the District Court of Gällivare ruled that the Sámi reindeer herding community 
of Gírjas alone has the right to hunt and fish on their traditional lands; rights 
the Swedish State claims to belong to the State as being the rightful owner of 
these lands (Gällivare Tingsrätt 2016). In both these cases the decisions caused 
political discussions among the politicians within the Sámediggi as to whether 
this can be seen as success for Sámi rights in general, or if it just consolidated 
the rights of the Sámi reindeer herders, leaving the non-reindeer herding Sámi 
with no rights at all (see e.g., Sveriges Radio 2016). 
This example leads us to the second problem: if there are profound cleavages 
within an indigenous people, it may make it hard or even impossible to articulate 
demands and right claims through their representative body in a unified voice. 
In Sweden, one of the government’s main arguments for the establishment of a 
parliament was formulated in terms of having “a uniform Sámi outlook”, that 
could “contribute to a uniform [State] Sámi policy” (SOU 1989:41, 150, 149), 
leaving a divided Sámi people with less political leverage in negotiations with 
the State. Third, these historically constructed cleavages and absence of “a 
uniform outlook” tend to support a continued paternalistic world-view even in 
a more democratic setting. When, for instance, right claims are put forward on 
issues where an indigenous people is deeply divided, the State often takes on the 
position as “neutral arbitrator”, by referring to the indigenous people’s internal 
strife and the role of the State as “impartial umpire” in trying to sort out these 
internal conflicts. Political status quo tends to be the default answer, while the 
blame is on the indigenous people itself and not on the state policy that initially 
caused and still maintains the cleavage/s. 
Without recognising the historical legacy of the “divide and rule” politics—
and its consequences—it is hard to challenge the contemporary domination 
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and oppression of indigenous peoples, even when there exists an indigenous 
popularly elected representative body.  
The right to define the people
Compared to the legal framework in Norway and Sweden, the Sámi in Finland 
have the strongest legal protection, as mentioned above, but these formal rights 
have only been transformed into political action to a very limited extent. In 
accordance with this discrepancy between the legal system and its practice, the 
Finnish Sámediggi seems to have the weakest position of the three Sámediggis 
(see e.g., Josefsen 2007; Robbins 2015). This weak position has, for instance, 
manifested itself on several occasions when the Finnish Supreme Administrative 
Court has overruled decisions made by the Sámediggi on applications to register 
on the Sámi electoral roll. The State thus made interventions in the Sámediggi’s 
right to define the people, stated in the UNDRIP (Art. 33) as follows: “Indigenous 
peoples have the right to determine their own identity or membership in accord-
ance with their customs and traditions. […] Indigenous peoples have the right 
to determine the structures and to select the membership of their institutions 
in accordance with their own procedures”. The conflictual and controversial 
discussion in Finland on the right to register on the electoral roll, as well as 
the criteria for doing so, is however, not only a conflict between the Sámi and 
the Finnish State, it has also brought to the fore another topical question: “who 
are the Saami who should decide who is a Saami?”, as Hugh Beach (2007, 2) 
poses it in the Swedish context. The criteria for registering on the electoral roll 
has thus led to a conflict “between the Sámi political establishment, the State of 
Finland and locals with various ethnic backgrounds” (Valkonen, Valkonen and 
Koivurova 2016). 
There are four factors that make this issue so conflictual in Finland in com-
parison to Norway and Sweden, where there have been few conflicts regarding 
the criteria for registering on the Sámi electoral roll so far. An election study 
carried out in conjunction with the Sámediggi elections in Norway and Sweden 
2013—in which the respondents were all already registered on the electoral 
roll—showed that a majority in both countries were satisfied with the criteria 
(66 percent in Norway and 54 percent in Sweden). Nonetheless, 25 percent in 
Norway and 34 percent in Sweden wanted to extend the criteria for enrolment, 
and 9 percent in Norway and 12 percent in Sweden wanted to narrow it (Pettersen 
2015). 
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The first factor is the actual difference in the criteria for registering, as 
discussed earlier. In all three countries a subjective criterion on self-declared 
identity is used together with an objective language criterion, but in Finland 
another objective criterion is used as well: that “he is a descendent of a person 
who has been entered in a land, taxation or population register as a mountain, 
forest or fishing Lapp”. This criterion makes the formal right to register con-
siderably more inclusive than in the other two countries. Second, the origin 
of the electoral roll in Finland, where a questionnaire survey in a demograph-
ic research project in 1962 laid the foundation, can be questioned both with 
regards to the geographical research area and who was interviewed and who 
was left out. In both Norway and Sweden the electoral register was constructed 
anew. Third, in Norway and Sweden the electoral roll has so far mainly been 
perceived as important for the right to vote, not as an official register of the 
Sámi population. This is in contrast to Finland, where the electoral roll has 
been claimed both to provide “exact information […] on the demographic and 
socio-economic changes among the Sami in Finland” (Müller-Wille 1979, 66), 
and to be of utmost importance for the “the Finnish Sami subjectivity” since 
Sámi subjectivity “is strongly connected with the right to vote in the elections 
of the Sami Parliament and is, therefore, the basis of Sami rights as indige-
nous people” (Joona 2015, 155). This third factor is closely intertwined with 
the fourth: in Finland discussions on the electoral roll has been closely related 
to the debate on ratification of C169—especially the right to land—but also the 
on-going work on a Nordic Sámi Convention (see e.g., Aikio and Åhrén 2013; 
J. Joona 2015; T. Joona 2015). The conflict on the Sámi register in Finland may 
therefore be explained both in terms of economic and political strategies, for 
persons not yet enrolled on the voting register, but also as a struggle to be rec-
ognised as Sámi (Sarivaara, Uusiautti and Määtta 2013).
Before the establishment of the Sámediggi, during the Sámi Delegation period, 
the voting register had not grown significantly, but prior to the 1999 Sámediggi 
election—the second election in Finland—1,128 applications were filed for reg-
istration.9 The Sámediggi’s electoral board rejected most of these registrations, 
656 of which appealed the decision to the Finnish Supreme Administrative 
Court (after having been rejected also by the first instance of appeal, the gov-
ernmental body of the Sámediggi), who reviewed the decision of the parliament. 
9  In contrast to the election rolls in Norway (from 5,505 in 1989 to 15,356 in 2015) and Sweden (from 5,390 in 1993 
to 8,322 in 2013), the election roll has not grown significantly between elections. In 2003 there were 5,155 registered 
voters, in 2007 5,317 voters and in 2011 5,483 voters.
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The court rejected all but seven of these (T. Joona 2012). However, in 2011 the 
Supreme Administrative Court overruled the Sámediggi’s decision not to accept 
four applicant individuals onto the electoral roll. “The court decided that four 
of the appellants should be added to the register. Three of them were accepted 
on the basis of the language criteria, even though they did not speak the Sami 
language. Their forefathers had been marked as Lapps in the land and taxation 
register of 1825” (T. Joona 2015, 168).10 In 2015, 182 persons appealed the 
Sámediggi rejection of their applications to register on the electoral roll, and 
93 were accepted by the Supreme Administrative Court, thus overruling the 
decision of the Sámediggi. One person was accepted on the register on the basis 
of having one ancestor in a register as far back as 1739. The court stated that 
the “petitioner, who regarded themselves as Sámi and according to a certificate 
issued by an archival authority was descendant to a person who in the land book 
for 1739 had been recorded as belonging to the lapps, and in a credible way had 
investigated their Sámi family background, and their strong private as well as 
professional involvement in the Sámi language and Sami culture, would from 
an overall assessment be considered a Sámi in the manner provided for in § 3 of 
the Sami Parliament Act” (HFD 2015, 145).11
Already in 2011, the Supreme Administrative Court’s ruling had caused 
protests from the non-governmental Sámi Council, asking the Finnish govern-
ment in an undated letter for an amendment of the Sámi Parliament Act on the 
criteria to register on the electoral roll (Sami Council, undated). In the statement, 
the Sámi Council argued that a person’s identity cannot be anchored back to a 
single ancestor registered as “lapp” hundreds of years ago. The Sámi Council 
also argued, with reference to the Supreme Administrative Court’s decision, that 
a mere claim from a person that they fulfilled the language criterion was not 
enough to say that that was actually the case; certain objective sources verifying 
language proficiency should be presented (Sami Council, undated).
The Sámediggi has continuously worked to change the criteria for register-
ing on the electoral roll, and in 2015 the Finnish parliament put the question 
on its agenda. The proposed new definition, which was to replace the former 
on descent from persons registered on the “lapp register”, was that “he or she 
has acquired Sámi culture through their family and has upheld the connection 
with this culture and is a descendant to a person that has been registered as lapp 
10  “In the cases of 1999 the Court refused to look back any further than 1875”, according to Tanja Joona (2015, 168).
11  HFD is an abbreviation of Högsta Förvaltningsdomstolen, the Supreme Administrative Court.
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in a Government document measured for taxation or population registration” 
(Regeringen 2014a). Moreover, in the proposal there was also an emphasis on 
the right of the Sámediggi to handle all applications of registration and dereg-
istration on the electoral roll. The Sámediggi was in favour of the proposed 
changes. The national parliament voted, however, against changing the criterion, 
with the result that the criterion from 1995 remains intact in spite of fierce oppo-
sition from the Sámediggi. 
The conflict thus mainly evolved around the objective criterion that does not 
exist in Norway or Sweden. Neither the Sámediggi in Finland nor the Sámi 
Council considered the criterion based on descent from someone registered in 
the former land, taxation or population register from several hundred years ago 
to be a legitimate one for registering on the electoral roll, as it is not based 
on the Sámi conception of themselves as an ethnic and indigenous group. Nor 
has the Sámediggi approved the rulings of the court; rather it has stressed the 
self-determination of the Sámi and the definition of a Sámi as based on the 
traditional kinship-based system.12 The criteria for registering in the electoral 
roll are, however, not only part of a conflict between the Sámediggi and the 
Finnish state, as mentioned earlier. The debate on the electoral roll must also be 
understood as part of the debate on a Finnish ratification of C169. For persons 
not in the electoral roll it might be regarded as a wise strategy to pursue a goal 
of being registered to be able to benefit from these rights (see, e.g., Aikio and 
Åhréns 2014: J. Joona 2013; T. Joona 2012; Lehtola 2015; Nyyssönen 2015; 
Pietikäinen 2003; Sarivaara, Uusiautti and Määtta 2013). The high number of 
applicants turned down by both the Sámediggi and the Supreme Administrative 
Court indicates that non-Sámi try to register on the electoral roll, and that the 
enrollment criteria might be wide enough for non-Sámi to register. 
 In the debate, these considerations support one interpretation of who the new 
applicants are. According to, for instance, Scott Forest (2006, 235), they are 
part of a resistance movement13 “who reject the idea of special Sami rights and 
demands equal land and political rights […] based on l and ownership records 
and traditional livelihoods”. These applicants are descendants to both Sámi 
and Finns who today are assimilated into the Finnish majority. Forest regards 
their applications to the electoral roll as a direct result of the wider criterion to 
register on the electoral roll introduced in 1995. The movement emerged artic-
12  The Sámediggi has appealed the court decisions in 2015 to the UN Human Rights Committee (Sveriges Radio 
2015) http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=2327&artikel=6270894).
13  The Association of Lapp Culture and Traditions
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ulating an indigenous identity based on links to ancestors listed in the former 
“Lapp register”. 
Although in agreement with this view on the origin of some of the applicants, 
the “Lapps”, as a group of non-Sámi who strongly oppose the Sámi, scholars 
identify yet another group of applicants, namely what they call the non-sta-
tus Sámi (see e.g., Sarivaara, Uusiautti and Määtta 2013; Sarivaara, Maata and 
Uusiautti 2013). The non-status Sámi are described as living within Sámi society, 
they speak Sámi and work within Sámi society, but have not been enrolled in the 
electoral roll. The applications to register on the electoral roll need thus not have 
anything to do with land rights; rather they might be understood as a struggle for 
recognition on the part of individual Sámi. These applications might therefore 
challenge a strict application of the criteria for other reasons than strategical. 
From their perspective the Sámediggi are discriminating against a part of the 
Sámi people, and upholds the role as gatekeeper for the electoral roll in a way 
that may violate the international instruments established to protect indigenous 
people. Moreover, it may even reify the State’s assimilation policy by not rec-
ognising them as Sámi.
It has been claimed that the dominating idea in the debate on indigenous 
rights—and explicitly stated in the UNDRIP, as we saw above—is that the 
“question of ‘who is indigenous?’ is best answered by indigenous communities 
themselves” (Corntassel 2003, 75). In the UNDRIP, however, there is also an 
article included on individual rights stating that: “Indigenous peoples and indi-
viduals have the right to belong to an indigenous community or nation, in ac-
cordance with the traditions and customs of the community or nation concerned. 
No discrimination of any kind may arise from the exercise of such a right” (Art. 
9).  International law has thus not accepted the argument that individual human 
rights always have precedence over indigenous peoples’ collective human rights 
but the two sets of rights ought to be balanced against one another. This does 
not mean that that all sorts of cultural practices within indigenous societies 
have to be accepted; rather a conflict between a collective and an individual 
right ought to be determined on a case-by-case basis which allows indigenous 
peoples to take responsibility for their own cultures (Åhrén 2016). Moreover, 
[n]on-discrimination principles identify prohibited grounds of exclusion” as 
Kirsty Gover argues (2014, 207), “but do not usually provide a positive theory 
of permissible grounds and there is a danger that the application of unmodified 
non-discrimination law to Indigenous communities could progressively divest 
them of their means of self-constitution”.
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To conclude this part, the Finnish case brings to the fore the challenges 
following a public recognition of identity, however, these are not just challeng-
es the State have to face but also the Sámediggi. It illustrates the ever present 
boundary problem in both democratic theory and practice on the right to define 
the people, and how that could be done in a democratic way (see e.g., Näsström 
2007). The right for an indigenous people to define membership is no different; 
it may always run the risk of excluding individuals and thereby be discriminat-
ing in character. 
Furthermore, the Finnish case also highlights the problematic aspects of 
linking legal Sámi rights on an individual level directly to a register that was 
established for democratic voting, which leads us to the initial issue on the right 
to decide on the electoral roll, and the conflict between the Sámediggi and the 
Finnish State. When passing the Sámi Parliament Act in 1995, the State did 
establish a Sámi democratic body, and did lay down in law that it should have 
cultural autonomy within the Sámi homeland. The Sámediggi in Finland is, 
according to the sections on autonomy and negotiations in the Sámi Parliament 
Act, a self-determining body in the sense of internal or institutional self-deter-
mination. Indigenous institutional self-determination is a premise for develop-
ing self-determination in relation to states (Young 2007), whether manifested 
as a territorial or a non-territorial self-determination (Keating 2012). From this 
perspective, one could expect that decisions regarding the basis of the Sámi 
democracy, the electoral roll, would be solely under the management of the 
Sámediggi. 
The protection of individual human rights is, however, also of immense 
importance and the potential conflict between indigenous peoples’ collective 
human rights and individual human rights is a problem facing many indigenous 
peoples around the world. To hand over appeals on the right to register on the 
electoral roll (or on membership issues in general) to institutions of the na-
tion-state, like the Finnish Supreme Administrative Court, does not seem to be 
a viable solution in order to enhance indigenous self-determination. Indigenous 
institutions of appeal beyond the decision-making body on membership (in this 
case the Sámediggi) might be one way of balancing between a collective and an 
individual right like, for instance, a common Nordic Sámi institution open for 
appeals from individuals in all three countries.
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Concluding remarks
This article confirms previous research with its findings that the actual differenc-
es between the Nordic Sámediggis are quite extensive in spite of the similar in-
stitutional construction, and the fact that they are established within nation-states 
that resemble each other politically in many ways (see e.g., Hocking 2005; 
Josefsen 2007; Robbins 2011, 2015). From this perspective, the Sámediggis 
ought maybe to be analysed as three distinct ways of institutionalising non-ter-
ritorial indigenous self-determination, rather than as a unified Nordic model. 
The nation-states policies—both historically and contemporary—seem to be too 
divergent to allow for an analysis of the Sámediggis as part of one model, and 
too many factors affect the actual self-determination of the parliaments. Here 
we have discussed, for instance, the actual legal base of the parliaments and 
its implementation in political practice, and how the nations-state’s historical 
legacy and the colonial past is handled in contemporary politics. Other factors 
are the representative body’s economic independence of the State (non-exist-
ing in the case of all three Sámediggis, although the Norwegian has the best 
financial situation), and how international law is interpreted and implemented 
on a national level. However, the Norwegian case also shows the importance of 
the strategy chosen by an indigenous representative body—within the set legal 
parameters—in order to challenge state policy and to enhance influence and 
autonomy, i.e. to advance a relational form of self-determination. 
Our comparison also shows that it is obvious that the Sámediggis striving 
for increased Sámi self-determination meet resistance from the states and the 
majority societies, even though the resistance is expressed differently and is 
shown at very different levels within the three countries. The Finnish legal 
framework recognises the Sámi as an indigenous people in the Constitution, 
and the Sámi Parliament Act established an independent and autonomous 
Sámediggi with a right to negotiate on matters of importance to the Sámi. In 
reality, however, the Finnish State holds a strong position, shown, for instance, 
when the Sámediggi’s decisions on one of the most decisive issues—the right 
to define the people and criteria for defining membership—have on several 
occasions been overruled by the State, demonstrating the apparent limits to the 
Sámi right to self-determination. In Sweden, the Sámediggi’s subordination to 
the national government was built into its construction as a government agency 
with no decision-making power on the most salient issues within Sámi society. 
The political strategy of divide and rule that the Swedish State has replicated 
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over the past 130 years has positioned the Sámi voters as well as the political 
parties within the Sámediggi around the conflict of who has the right to use tradi-
tional Sámi lands and recourses. This positioning is shown in voting behaviour, 
party structure as well as in policy dimensions within the Sámediggi. At the 
same time, the Swedish State uses this political cleavage within Sámi society as 
an argument for not increasing Sámi self-determination, causing frustration and 
very low levels of trust among the voters for their own elected representative 
body. These effects of state policy expressed in Sweden within the Sámediggi, 
is in Finland expressed “outside” the Sámediggi in the conflict on the right to 
register on the electoral roll. 
The Norwegian Sámediggi shows that a more powerful indigenous parlia-
ment might also be regarded as a threat to others who might feel disempowered. 
The examples are few, but still there is a question of whether or not we can 
see a change in the Norwegian authorities’ approach to Sámi rights towards a 
more dismissive attitude. This raises the question of whether in contemporary 
Norwegian politics we are once again witnessing how an indigenous people’s 
right to self-determination is delimited: so far, but no further.
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